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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
BOB LESTER BOREN,
aka BOBBY LEE BOREN
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO.41115
CANYON COUNTY NO. CR 2011-19635

APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN RESPONSE
TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF PETITION FOR REVIEW

---------------------)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Bob Boren pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm specifically preserving
his right to assert on appeal that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss
the charge. The Idaho Court of Appeals vacated Mr. Boren's conviction and reversed
the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss. State v. Boren, 2013 Opinion
No. 17 (Ct. App. March 14, 2013) (hereinafter, Opinion).

The State filed a timely

Petition for Review and this Court granted the State's request.
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(See Order Granting

Respondent's Petition for Review, dated June 19, 2013). Mr. Boren asserts that this
Court should either adopt the reasoning of the majority of the Court of Appeals, or adopt
the reasoning of Judge Melanson who concurred in the result, and vacate Mr. Boren's
conviction and reverse the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Boren with unlawful possession of a firearm, in violation of
I.C. § 18-3316, based upon his knowing possession of firearms and having been
previously convicted of two out-of-state felonies: possession of a controlled substance delivery, in the State of Oregon in 1984; and, possession of a controlled substance for
purpose of sale, in the State of Nevada in 1988. (R., pp.18-19.) Counsel for Mr. Boren
filed a Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum Supporting the Motion to Dismiss.
(R., pp.27-31.)

Mr. Boren's basic argument was that pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-

310(2)(kk), because his felonies occurred prior to 1991, his gun rights in Idaho were
automatically restored upon his final discharge from each felony case, despite the fact
that his felonies occurred in states other than Idaho.

(R., pp.27-31.)

The State

countered that because Mr. Boren's convictions were not Idaho convictions, pursuant to
Idaho Code § 18-310(4), his gun rights were not restored automatically, and he was
required to file a petition with the Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole pursuant to
I.C. § 18-310(3). (Response Brief to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.) 1
After hearing the arguments of counsel, the district court agreed with the State's
interpretation of the relevant statutes and denied Mr. Boren's motion to dismiss.

Mr. Boren filed a Motion to Augment the record with the State's Response Brief to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss which was granted by this Court.
1
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(R., pp.39-44; Tr. 11/B/11.) Mr. Boren entered into conditional guilty plea to the charge
of felon in possession of a firearm, preserving his right to challenge the district court's
denial of his motion to dismiss on appeal;2 in exchange, the State agreed to recommend
a unified sentence of three years, with one year fixed, suspended, with Mr. Boren
placed on probation. (R., pp.47-53; Tr. 12/20/11, p.1, L.4 - p.9, L.19.) The district court
sentenced Mr. Boren to a unified term of three years, with one year fixed, and placed
him on probation for a period of three years. (R., pp.54-5B, 62-65; Tr. 1/31/12, p.30,
Ls.B-14.) Mr. Boren filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.66-69.)
Although he was "[m]indful of the language contained in the relevant statutes and
the relevant standards of review," Mr. Boren asserted in his Appellant's Brief that the
district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss by misinterpreting the relevant
statutes.

(See Appellant's Brief, pp.4-10.) Alternatively, Mr. Boren asserted that, by

application of the rule of lenity, the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss.

(See Appellant's Brief, p.10.)

The State countered that the district court correctly

interpreted the relevant statutes and correctly denied Mr. Boren's motion to dismiss.

(See generally, Respondent's Brief.)

A majority of the Court of Appeals ultimately

construed the relevant statute to apply equally, regardless of whether an individual's
qualifying pre-1991 conviction was from Idaho or was from another State; thus, the
majority found that the district court erred in denying Mr. Boren's motion to dismiss.
(Opinion, pp.1-5.) Judge Melanson authored an opinion concurring in the result based
upon his belief that the statute in question was ambiguous and the rule of lenity should
apply, requiring the Court to vacate Mr. Boren's conviction and reverse the district

2 Thus, Mr. Boren is precluded from raising any attacks to the constitutionality of Idaho
Code § 1B-31 0 in this appeal.
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court's order denying his motion to dismiss. (Opinion, p.5 (J. Melanson concurring in
the result).) This Court granted the State's timely Petition for Review.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Boren's Motion to Dismiss?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Boren's Motion To Dismiss
A.

Introduction
The facts in the present case are not in dispute - Mr. Boren has two out-of-state

felony convictions preceding 1991. The question for this Court to consider is a matter of
statutory interpretation - whether Idaho Code § 18-310(2)(kk), which automatically
restores the right to possess firearms when an individual has been finally discharged of
certain enumerated felonies committed prior to 1991, applies equally regardless of
whether the felony was committed in Idaho or another State. Mr. Boren asserts that this
Court should review his motion to dismiss de novo as the facts of this case are not in
dispute: He was convicted of felonies in states other than Idaho, prior to 1991; he has
since been finally "discharged" of those felonies having served all sentencing
obligations; and, he possessed a firearm in Canyon County on July 15, 2011.
Mr. Boren asserts under Idaho Code § 18-310(2)(kk), his right to possess a firearm was
automatically restored upon the discharge of his prior felonies and; therefore, as a
matter of law, he cannot be convicted of violating I.C. § 18-3316 (unlawful possession of
a firearm).
Mr. Boren requests that this Court either adopt the reasoning of the Court of
Appeals' majority or the reasoning of Judge Melanson's opinion concurring in the result,
and find that Mr. Boren was afforded the same privilege as those who were convicted of
the same type of felony in Idaho prior to 1991. Thus, Mr. Boren requests that this Court
vacate his conviction and reverse the order denying his Motion to Dismiss.
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B.

Because His Convictions Pre-date 1991, And Because He Has Completed His
Sentences, Mr. Boren Is Not Subject To The Firearm Prohibition Imposed By
Idaho Code § 18-3316(1)
Mr. Boren was charged with violation Idaho Code § 18-3316(1) which reads as

follows:
A person who previously has been convicted of a felony who purchases,
owns, possesses, or has under his custody or control any firearm shall be
guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a period of
time not to exceed five (5) years and by a fine not to exceed five thousand
dollars ($5,000)
I.C. § 18-3316(1). However, this section is modified by Idaho Code § 18-3316(4) which
reads,
Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to a person whose
conviction has been nullified by expungement, pardon, setting aside the
conviction or other comparable procedure by the jurisdiction where the
felony conviction occurred; or whose civil right to bear arms either
specifically or in combination with other civil rights has been
restored by any other provision of Idaho law.
I.C. § 18-3316(4) (emphasis added). Thus, a convicted felon may lawfully possess a
firearm in Idaho provided that their right to bear arms has been restored pursuant to
Idaho law.
Idaho Code § 18-31 O( 1) provides that a sentence to the custody of the Idaho
state board of corrections suspends all civil rights, "provided further that any such
person may lawfully exercise all civil rights that are not political during any period of
parole or probation, except the right to ship, transport, possess or receive a
firearm, and the right to refuse treatment authorized by the sentencing court."
I.C. § 18-310(1) (emphasis added).

Thus, while a felon is under the custody of the

Idaho state board of corrections, that felon may not lawfully possess a firearm.
Furthermore, Idaho Code § 18-310(2) provides,
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Upon final discharge, a person convicted of any Idaho felony shall be
restored the full rights of citizenship, except that for persons convicted
of treason or those offenses enumerated in paragraphs (a) through
Uj) of this subsection the right to ship, transport, possess or receive
a firearm shall not be restored. As used in this subsection, "final
discharge" means satisfactory completion of imprisonment, probation and
parole as the case may be
I.C. § 18-310(2) (emphasis added).3 Idaho Code § 18-310(3) allows a person to apply
to the commission of pardons and parole to have their right to possess a firearm
restored, at any time five years after final discharge. I.C. § 18-310(3). Thus, while most
of a convicted felon's civil rights are automatically restored upon final discharge, the
right to bear arms is not.
However, these provisions generally do not apply to people convicted of most of
the enumerated felonies (including delivery or possession with the intent to deliver a
controlled substance), if that conviction occurred prior to July 1, 1991, as § 1831 0(2)(kk) states,
The provisions of this subsection shall apply only to those persons
convicted of the enumerated felonies in paragraphs (a) through Uj) of
this subsection on or after July 1, 1991, except that persons convicted
of the felonies enumerated in paragraphs (s) and (t) of this subsection, for
any degree of murder or voluntary manslaughter, shall not be restored the
right to ship, transport, possess or receive a firearm regardless of the date
of their conviction if the conviction was the result of an offense committed
by use of a firearm.

3 It was uncontested that Mr. Boren's prior out-of-state convictions are covered by this
code section. Idaho Code § 18-310(2)(dd), describes "felonious manufacture, delivery
or possession with the intent to manufacture or deliver, or possession of a controlled or
counterfeit substance (37-2732, Idaho Code)," which Mr. Boren concedes describes the
Idaho equivalent of felony possession of a controlled substance - delivery, as defined
by Oregon law, and possession of a controlled substance for purpose of sale, as
defined by Nevada law.
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I.C. § 18-310(2)(kk) (emphasis added). Therefore, reading these provisions in pari
materia people convicted of felonies prior to July 1, 1991, have their right to possess

firearms automatically restored upon final discharge of their convictions. 4
However, Idaho Code § 18-310(4) reads as follows:
Persons convicted of felonies in other states or jurisdictions shall be
allowed to register and vote in Idaho upon final discharge which means
satisfactory completion of imprisonment, probation and parole as the case
may be. These individuals shall not have the right restored to ship,
transport, possess or receive a firearm, in the same manner as an
Idaho felon as provided in subsection (2) of this section.
I.C. § 18-310(4) (emphasis added). Thus, the question presented to the district court
was whether, reading all of these statutes together, Idaho law treats individuals
convicted of felonies the same regardless of where their felony convictions occurred.
Mr. Boren argued in the district court that I.C. § 18-310(4) applies I.C. § 18310(2)(kk)'s pre-1991 exemption equally to those whose enumerated felonies were
committed out-of-State or in Idaho, and argued alternatively that the if the statute is
ambiguous, the rule of lenity should apply and the statute should be construed in favor
of Mr. Boren.

(Tr. 11/8/11, p.5, L.5 - p.?, L.2.)

The State argued that the statute

unambiguously distinguishes between those with Idaho felonies prior to 1991, and those
with out-of-state felonies prior to 1991 - the former have their right to possess firearms
automatically restored upon final discharge, while the latter must seek relief through the
provisions of I.e. § 18-310(3) (Tr. 11/8/11, p.?, L.5 - p.8, L.21.) In its written ruling, the
district court found that "by its express language, section 310(2) does not operate to

It appears that prior to April 1, 1991, a convicted felon'S right to possess firearms was
automatically restored, along with most other civil rights, upon final discharge. See
I.C. § 18-310 (1990).

4
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restore Boren's right to bear arms after final discharge from the alleged out-of-state
convictions." (R., p.42.) The district court, thus, denied Mr. Boren's motion to dismiss. 5
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review by
an appellate court.

State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 865 (2011).

The following

principles of statutory interpretation apply:
The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the
legislative body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins with
the literal language of the statute. Provisions should not be read in
isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire document.
The statute should be considered as a whole, and words should be given
their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be noted that the Court
must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so that none
will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory language is
unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be
given effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory
construction.
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866-67 (2011) (citing Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund,
147 Idaho 307, 310 (2009).) "'The rule of lenity states that criminal statutes must be
strictly construed in favor of defendants.'" State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103 (2008)
(quoting State v. Barnes, 124 Idaho 379, 380 (1993) overruled on other grounds (citing
State v. Sivak, 119 Idaho 320, 325 (1990))).

The power to correct a socially or

otherwise unsound statute lies with the legislature, and not the judiciary. Verska v. St.
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889,892-893 (2011).

5 The thrust of the district court's ruling is that Idaho law treats people with out-of-state
felonies less favorably in terms of restoration of Second Amendment rights than it treats
people with Idaho felonies.
Assuming, but not conceding, the district court's
interpretation is correct, Idaho Code § 18-310 is subject to a Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection / right to travel constitutional challenge. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S.
489 (1999); State v. Yeoman, 149 Idaho 505 (2010). As this challenge was not made in
the district court and no right to raise such a challenge was preserved through his
conditional guilty plea, Mr. Boren reserves his right to raise this claim through postconviction proceedings.
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The Court of Appeals found that although the State's interpretation is "not
unreasonable," the last sentence of § 18-310(4) "is awkwardly phrased and ambiguous
at best," and that "the placement of the comma after the word 'firearm' in that sentence,"
and the legislative history, confirm that the State's interpretation is incorrect. (Opinion,
pA.) The Court of Appeals went on to find the following:
If the legislative intent in subsection (4) was to bar restoration of rights to
persons with out-of-state convictions, there would be no need for the
comma at all. Indeed, there would be no need for the entire remainder of
the sentence after the word "firearm." The inclusion of the comma
followed by the words "in the same manner as an Idaho felon as provided
in subsection (2) of this section" indicates that the intent was to make
persons with felonies from other states subject to the same subsection (2)
limitations on restoration of their rights that apply to Idaho felons. The
sentence would then mean that those with felonies from other states may
not have their rights restored in the same manner and to the same extent
as Idaho felons may not have their rights restored under subsection (2).
The legislative history of subsection (4) discloses that its purpose
was indeed to make subsection (2) applicable to persons with felonies
from other jurisdictions in the same manner as it is applicable to those with
Idaho felonies. Subsection (4) was added by a 2004 amendment. 2004
Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 166 at 541-43. The minutes of a House State
Affairs Committee hearing of January 27, 2004, indicate that the Secretary
of State spoke in support of the bill and "said that it ensures that persons
who were convicted of a felony in another state ... and subsequently
moved to Idaho will receive the full rights of citizenship. ... They will be
bound by the same restrictions that apply to Idaho felons who have
fulfilled their sentence requirements e.g. firearms restrictions." Given this
clear statement of the purpose of the legislation, we conclude that
subsection (4) makes all provisions and restrictions of subsection (2)
applicable to felony convictions from outside of Idaho, including the
provisions of subsection (2)(kk). Accordingly, because Boren's out-ofstate convictions for drug offenses were committed prior to 1991, section
18-310(2), and in particular subsection (2)(kk), automatically restored his
right to bear arms when he completed his probation for the predicate
felonies. It follows that Boren's motion to dismiss this case should have
been granted.
(Opinion, ppA-5.) Mr. Boren respectfully requests that this Court adopt the majority of
the Court of Appeals' reasoning and find that the pre-1991 exemption found in I.C. § 18-
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310(2)(kk) applies equally, regardless of whether the individual's conviction arose from
Idaho or another jurisdiction; therefore, he could not be convicted under I.C. § 18-3316
of unlawful possession of a firearm and the district court should have granted his Motion
to Dismiss.

C.

By Application Of The Rule Of Lenity. The District Court Erred In Denying
Mr. Boren's Motion To Dismiss
Alternatively, Mr. Boren asserts that this Court should adopt the reasoning of

Judge Melanson in his opinion concurring in the result and find the provisions of I.C. §§
18-310(2)(kk) and 18-310(4) to be ambiguous, apply the rule of lenity, and vacate his
conviction and reverse the district court's denial of his Motion to Dismiss.

While

rejecting the majority's interpretation of the statute and its reliance upon testimony
before the legislative committee as a statement of purpose, Judge Melanson found,
in my view the statute is so amenable to conflicting interpretations
that this is a rare instance in which the rule of lenity should be
applied and the statute should be strictly construed in favor of the
accused. See State v. Martinez, 126 Idaho 801, 803, 891 P.2d 1061,
1063 (Ct. App. 1995). When that rule is applied, the majority reaches
what I believe to be the correct result.
(Opinion, p.5 (J. Melanson concurring in the result).) Mr. Boren asserts that, should this
Court reject the reasoning of the majority of the Court of Appeals, this Court should
adopt the reasoning of Judge Melanson and find the statute ambiguous, apply the rule
of lenity, and reverse the district court's order denying Mr. Boren's Motion to Dismiss.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Boren respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for unlawful
possession of a firearm by a felon, and to remand this case to the district court with
instructions that the charge be dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 8th day of July, 2013.

JA
N C. PINTLER
D puty State Appellate Public Defender
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